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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the decisional power index, the so called Hoede-Bakker
index. This index takes the preferences of the players into account, as well as
the social structure in which players may influence each other. We investigate
the properties of the Hoede-Bakker index. We adapt some postulates for power
indices and voting power paradoxes for the Hoede-Bakker set up. We inves-
tigate whether this decisional power index displays the adapted voting power
paradoxes and whether it satisfies the adapted postulates for power indices.
KEYWORDS: Hoede-Bakker index, power index, inclination vector, group
decision, voting power paradoxes, postulates for power indices
RUNNING TITLE: On the Hoede-Bakker index
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1 Introduction
Many power indices have been introduced (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Penrose,
1946; Banzhaf, 1965; Dubey and Shapley, 1979; Coleman, 1971; Johnston, 1978;
Deegan and Packel, 1978; Holler, 1982; Holler and Packel, 1983; etc.). A review
and a comparison of these power indices have been made, for instance, in Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998) or in Laruelle (2000). In the literature, some features
of power indices, called voting power paradoxes, have been investigated, for in-
stance, the paradox of new members and the paradox of large size (Brams, 1975;
see also Brams and Affuso, 1976), the paradox of redistribution (Fischer and
Schotter, 1978), and the quarrelling paradoxes (Kilgour, 1974). A theoretical
analysis and extensive discussion of power indices and voting power paradoxes
is given in Felsenthal and Machover (1998). There is also empirical research
on paradoxes of power indices (see, for instance, Schotter, 1982). In particu-
lar, the occurrence of voting power paradoxes in real politics has been studied
(Van Deemen and Rusinowska, 2003; Rusinowska, 2001; Rusinowska and Van
Deemen, 2004). More recently, Felsenthal, Machover, and Zwicker (Felsenthal
and Machover, 1995, 1998; Felsenthal, Machover, and Zwicker, 1998; see also
Laruelle, 2000) proposed some desirable properties of power indices, which they
refer to as postulates, the non-fulfilment of which they considered as paradoxi-
cal.
The aim of this paper is to investigate properties of the, as far as we know,
less well-known Hoede-Bakker index. Hoede and Bakker (1982) introduced the
concept of decisional power. The essential point of the Hoede-Bakker index is
the distinction between the inclination to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and the final decision
apparent in a vote. As Hoede and Bakker noticed, ‘In fact, it is the difference
between inclination and final decision in which the exertion of power on an
actor manifests itself’. In our opinion, the Hoede-Bakker index is an interesting
concept which deserves more attention, both from a theoretical and a practical
point of view. First of all, the Hoede-Bakker index is an innovative concept
in social network theories. It is defined for a social network, where influences
among players are taken into account. It presents a natural way of determining
the power of an actor in a network. The attractiveness of the Hoede-Bakker
index is also related to the applicability of this index. The Hoede-Bakker index
was already applied by Stokman and Willer (1999) to an analysis of Dutch and
German coalitions.
In this paper, we adapt some postulates for power indices and voting power
paradoxes (see, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) to the special
Hoede-Bakker set up. We propose some properties of the index defined for
a social network, the non-fulfilment of which seems to be paradoxical. These
properties are based on some parameters in a social network, like the number of
players influenced by a given player and the number of players influencing a given
player. A natural expectation may be that for a given network, the power of a
player should be non-decreasing with respect to the first parameter mentioned
and non-increasing with respect to the latter one. It seems also reasonable to
assume that, for instance, by influencing a greater number of players and being
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influenced by a smaller number of players, a given player should become more
powerful or, at least, should not lose power. Also forming a union in a social
network should be rewarding to the players who decide to unite. It seems also
reasonable to expect no actor to gain in terms of power from the appearance
of a new actor if in the new situation all old members do not become more
‘important’ (i.e., they neither influence a greater number of players nor are
influenced by a smaller number of players). The main aim of this paper is to
check whether the Hoede-Bakker index has such desirable properties.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a short survey of
postulates for power indices, and voting power paradoxes. All remaining sec-
tions, that is, Sections 3 - 8, concern the Hoede-Bakker index. In Section 3,
we describe the decisional power index. In Section 4, we show that this index
depends on the way the group decision is made. Section 5 concerns the case
with an even number of players. In Section 6, the decisional power index of a
set of players is analyzed. In Section 7, we deal with some further properties
of the Hoede-Bakker index. In particular, we check whether this index satis-
fies some postulates and displays some paradoxes. Finally, Section 8 contains
conclusions. The paper also has an appendix. It contains figures of all social
networks considered in the paper, tables with results for three figures, and a
table (Table 4) summarizing the results.
2 On Power Indices and their Properties
A (0,1)-game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} denotes the set of players
and v : 2N → {0, 1} is a function for which v(∅) = 0. A simple game is a (0,1)-
game such that v(N) = 1 and v is nondecreasing, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever
S ⊆ T ⊂ N . Any nonempty subset of N , ∅ '= S ⊆ N is called a coalition. A
coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1, and losing if v(S) = 0. Player k ∈ S is a
swinger in a winning coalition S, if his or her removal from this coalition makes
it losing, that is, if v(S) = 1 and v(S \{k}) = 0. We refer to a winning coalition
in which all players are swingers as a minimal winning coalition. If one player,
say player k ∈ N , forms the only minimal winning coalition, then k is called a
dictator. A dummy is a player who is a member of no minimal winning coalition.
Hence, a dictator, if there is one, can be characterized as the sole player who is
not a dummy.
One interesting class of simple games is the class of weighted voting games.
We use the symbol [q;w1, w2, ..., wn] to represent a weighted voting game, where
q is the quota needed for a coalition to win, and wk is the number of votes of
player k (k = 1, 2, ..., n). The quota q and the voting weights w1, w2, ..., wn are
positive integers with 0 < q ≤∑nk=1 wi. Then, the expression [q;w1, w2, ..., wn]
represents the simple game v : 2N → {0, 1} defined for all S ⊆ N by v(S) = 1
if
∑
k∈S wk ≥ q, and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
A power index is a function φ that associates with each simple game (N, v)
a vector φ = (φ1, ...,φn), where φk is interpreted as a measure of the influ-
ence that player k can exert on the outcome. Many ideas on how to evaluate
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the distribution of power among the players have been proposed. One should
mention, in particular, the Shapley-Shubik index, the normalized and absolute
Banzhaf indices, the Coleman indices, the Deegan-Packel index, and the Holler-
Packel index. For a broad overview of some (well-known) power indices see, for
instance, Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Laruelle (2000).
Next, we recapitulate some postulates (also called axioms in the literature)
concerning power indices and, closely related to the postulates, paradoxes of
power indices (or, rather, properties that are not satisfied). The properties of
voting power measures were presented in particular in Felsenthal and Machover
(1998) and Laruelle (2000). We add a postulate concerning a dummy.
Invariance postulate - A voter’s measure of power does not depend on his
name.
Normalization postulate - The voters’ measures of power add up to 1:∑
k∈N
φk(v) = 1. (1)
Dummy postulate - A player k is a dummy if and only if φk(v) = 0.
Monotonicity postulate - In a weighted voting body, a voter with a larger
voting weight cannot be in a worse position than a voter with a smaller voting
weight, i.e.,
if wk > wj , then φk(v) ≥ φj(v). (2)
Bloc postulate - If two voters always vote together so that they end up forming
a single voter, then the new voter has more power than each of the previous
voters. Given (N, v), we consider (N \ {j}, v′) such that v′(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) if
k ∈ S, and v′(S) = v(S) otherwise. The bloc postulate requires that
if φj(v) > 0, then φk(v′) > φk(v). (3)
A violation of the bloc postulate leads essentially to the paradox of large
size.
Paradox of large size (Brams, 1975) - This occurs when the power index of a
union of parties is less than the sum of the power indices of the separate parties
of that union. Let P ⊆ N be the set of players who decided to unite. Let us
call this union player U , where wU =
∑
k∈P wk. A power index φ displays the
paradox of large size if
φU <
∑
k∈P
φk. (4)
Donation postulate - In a weighted voting body, a voter cannot gain power
by distributing some of his voting weight to other voters. Let V = [q;w1, ..., wn],
V ′ = [q;w′1, ..., w′n], and
∑n
k=1 wk =
∑n
k=1 w
′
k. The donation postulate requires
that
if w′j ≥ wj for each j '= k and w′k < wk, then φk(V ′) ≤ φk(V ). (5)
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Assuming that more than one donor (i.e., a player getting a smaller weight)
may exist, the paradox of redistribution expresses the violation of the donation
postulate.
Paradox of redistribution (Fischer and Schotter, 1978) - This appears when
either a party’s voting weight decreases and at the same time its power index
increases, or when a party gains in terms of voting weight, but loses in voting
power. Let V = [q;w1, ..., wn], V ′ = [q;w′1, ..., w′n], and
∑n
k=1 wk =
∑n
k=1 w
′
k.
A power index φ displays the redistribution paradox if
for some k, w′k < wk and φk(V
′) > φk(V ). (6)
Paradox of new members (Brams, 1975; Brams and Affuso, 1976) - This ap-
pears when a new party joins the assembly and at least one old party has greater
voting power in this new situation than in the old one. Let V = [q;w1, ..., wn]
and V ′ = [q′;w1, ..., wn, wn+1]. A power index φ displays the paradox of new
members if
for some k ∈ N, φk(V ′) > φk(V ). (7)
3 Description of the Hoede-Bakker Index
In Brams and Affuso (1976), a distinction between an ‘outcome oriented mea-
sure’ and an ‘actor-oriented measure’ was discussed. The first measure is related
to the ability of players to control outcomes. The latter definition focuses on
the effects that actors have on other actors. The concept of decisional power
was introduced by Hoede and Bakker (1982). The Hoede-Bakker index is an
actor-oriented measure. Instead of measuring the power in terms of determin-
ing the outcome, this index is focused on the power of influencing players. The
definition of decisional power (Hoede and Bakker, 1982) is based on the fact
that, in situations in which decisions have to be made, the distinction between
the inclination to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and the actual decision is taken into account.
A player may, for instance, be in favor of a certain decision (a certain point at
issue), that is, his inclination is then ‘yes’, but in fact he says ‘no’ due to the
influence of other player(s).
In this section, we recapitulate the definition of the decisional power index
(the Hoede-Bakker index). Let us consider the following situation. There are
n ≥ 1 players who have to make a decision about a certain point at issue (to
accept or to reject a bill, a candidate, etc). By N we denote the set of all players
(actors, voters), that is, N = {1, ..., n}. With respect to the point at issue, each
player has an inclination either to say ‘yes’ (denoted by ‘1’) or ‘no’ (denoted
by ‘0’). Hence, for n players, we have 2n possible inclination vectors, that is,
n-vectors consisting of zeros and ones. An inclination vector will be denoted by
i, the set of all n-vectors by I. For n = 3 we have 8 inclination vectors. For
instance, i = (1, 1, 0) means that player 1 and 2 have the inclination ‘yes’, but
actor 3 has the inclination ‘no’.
Due to the influence among actors, a player’s decision may be different from
his inclination. We then say that each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed
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into a decision vector, denoted by b. Formally, such a transformation may
be represented by an operator, assigning to each inclination vector, a decision
vector resulting from the influence among players. We denote this operator by
B : I → I, that is,
b = Bi. (8)
Decision vector b is an n-vector consisting of zeros and ones (b ∈ I) and indicat-
ing the decisions made by all actors. For instance, B(1, 1, 0) = (1, 0, 0) means
that players 1 and 3 voted according to their inclinations (player 1 said ‘yes’,
player 3 - ‘no’), and actor 2 decided for ‘no’, although his inclination was ‘yes’.
The set of all decision vectors is denoted by B(I).
When all players made their individual decisions, a group decision must be
taken. It is represented by an operator gd, assigning to each decision vector,
a group decision (either ‘yes’ or ‘no’). Formally, the group decision is then a
function gd : B(I)→ {1,−1} defined on the vectors b, and it has the value +1
if the group decision is ‘yes’ and the value −1 if the group decision is ‘no’.
There are many possibilities to choose the operator B and the group decision
gd. Hoede and Bakker (1982) proposed two axioms which have to be satisfied
by B and gd. First, let us introduce some definitions.
Definition 3.1 For each inclination vector i = (i1, ..., in), the complement of i
is a vector ic = (ic1, ..., icn) such that for each k ∈ {1, ..., n}
ick =
{
1 if ik = 0
0 if ik = 1
. (9)
Definition 3.2
i ≤ i′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | ik = 1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | i′k = 1}. (10)
According to Hoede and Bakker (1982), B and gd have to satisfy the following
two axioms:
AXIOM (A-1):
∀i ∈ I [gd(Bic) = −gd(Bi)] (11)
AXIOM (A-2):
∀i ∈ I ∀i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi′)] (12)
Axiom (A-1) says that changing all inclinations leads to the opposite group
decision. Axiom (A-2) means monotonicity, more precisely, the group decision
‘yes’ is not changed into ‘no’ if the set of players with inclination ‘yes’ is enlarged.
Assuming both axioms (A-1) and (A-2) to be satisfied, Hoede and Bakker
defined a concept called the decisional power index or the Hoede-Bakker index.
Taking all possible configurations of players’ inclinations as equally probable,
the Hoede-Bakker index of a player is equal to the difference between the pro-
portion of times the group decision will follow that player’s inclination, and the
proportion of times, the group decision will be different from the inclination of
the player in question. We have the following formal definition:
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Definition 3.3 Given B and gd, the decisional power index (the Hoede-Bakker
index) of a player k ∈ N is given by
HB(k) =
1
2n−1
·
∑
{i: ik=1}
gd(Bi). (13)
Note that when defining this power index of a player, we assume this player to
have an inclination ‘yes’ and consider the group decisions for all 2n−1 inclination
vectors of the remaining players. If we assumed a player to have an inclination
‘no’ (and then considered the group decisions for all 2n−1 inclination vectors of
the remaining players), by virtue of axiom (A-1), the Hoede-Bakker index would
be a non-positive number with absolute value equal to that from Definition 3.3.
Hence, without loss of generality, we assume the player has an inclination ‘yes’.
Example 3.1 In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the Hoede-Bakker in-
dex, we consider a family network, consisting of three actors: player 1 (mother),
player 2 (father), and player 3 (child). The mother is influenced by no family
member, while the father happens to be influenced by his wife: he always de-
cides according to the inclination of his wife. The child is clearly under influence
of both parents. When their inclinations are the same, he follows the inclination
of his parents, but when their inclinations differ from each other, the child feels
free to follow his own inclination. Nevertheless, when making a family decision,
the child’s decision is never taken into account: the family will approve of a
given proposal (i.e., the group decision will be ‘yes’) if and only if both parents
decide for ‘yes’, otherwise the proposal is disapproved. This family network is
illustrated by Figure 1(b), and the group decision is shown in Table 1 (see Ap-
pendix). What can we say about such a family situation? Which indices should
we use?
First of all, let us notice that none of the ‘standard’ power indices considers
a social network and, in particular, the influence between players. They all
start from votes (i.e., decisions) of players. The Hoede-Bakker index is the only
one we know of that takes into account the influence among players and what
happens before the players make their decisions.
Let us apply then this index to our family network. The intuition says that
the child is clearly powerless in this game: he follows his inclination only in the
special case that his parents disagree, but he is never considered in the group
decision. We expect that the situation of player 1 is the strongest one, but
player 2 seems to have also some power, since the child respects him as much as
player 1, and moreover, the father is involved in the group decision. The Hoede-
Bakker index helps us to see the situation better. It happens that the index
of the mother is equal to 1, while both the indices of the father and the child
are equal to 0. We can say that the wife is a dictator (we will talk more about
dictatorship later on), but actually we have to do with a kind of hidden dictator
here. It is important to realize ‘what is really going on’ in a social network.
The Hoede-Bakker index seems to be very appropriate for considering influence
and power among players forming all kinds of networks: networks in families,
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institutions, politics, societies, etc. Hence, it is important to look carefully at
properties of this index.
4 Power Dependent on the Decision Operator
Hoede and Bakker (1982) considered a social network modelled as a directed
graph, and next, depending on the structure of the network, they defined the
operator B and the group decision operator gd. Note that, since B and gd
have to satisfy only two axioms, (A-1) and (A-2), the definition of B and gd
does not have to be unique. Because it will be used frequently below, we define
a Standard Procedure. According to this procedure, a non-influenced player
always follows his inclination, and an influenced player decides according to the
inclination of the majority (i.e., more than half) of the actors influencing him.
A group decision is made by simple majority. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 4.1 Let INF (k) denote the set of players influencing player k ∈ N ,
0 ≤ |INF (k)| ≤ n − 1, k /∈ INF (k), INF yes(k, i) = {m ∈ INF (k) | im = 1},
INFno(k, i) = {m ∈ INF (k) | im = 0}, where i = (i1, ..., in) denotes an
inclination vector. Bi = (b1, ..., bn) denotes the decision vector for i.
For n odd, the Standard Procedure or Procedure 1 for the operator B and the
group decision operator gd is defined as follows. For each k ∈ N :
1. If |INF (k)| = 0, then for each i = (i1, ..., in), bk = ik.
2. If |INF (k)| > 0, then for each i = (i1, ..., in):
(a) if |INF yes(k, i)| > |INFno(k, i)|, then bk = 1,
(b) if |INF yes(k, i)| < |INFno(k, i)|, then bk = 0,
(c) if |INF yes(k, i)| = |INFno(k, i)|, then bk = ik.
For each i = (i1, ..., in):
gd(Bi) =
{
+1 if |{k ∈ N | bk = 1}| ≥ [n2 ] + 1−1 otherwise , (14)
where [x] means the greatest integer not greater than x.
Proposition 4.1 For n odd, the operators B and gd, as defined in the Standard
Procedure, satisfy both axioms (A-1) and (A-2).
Proof: Let i = (i1, ..., in) be arbitrary and let it contain x 1’s and n − x 0’s,
0 ≤ x ≤ n. We determine Bi = (b1, ..., bn) and gd(Bi). Let Bi contain y 1’s
and n− y 0’s. If y ≥ [n2 ] + 1, then gd(Bi) = 1, otherwise gd(Bi) = −1.
Now, let us consider ic. It contains n − x 1’s and x 0’s. We determine Bic =
(b′1, ..., b′n). For each player k such that |INF (k)| = 0, b′k = ick = −ik = −bk.
For each player k such that |INF (k)| > 0, also b′k = −bk. Then, Bic =
−(b1, ..., bn) = −Bi. Hence, Bic contains y 0’s and n− y 1’s.
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Suppose that n is odd. Then, [n2 ]+1 =
n+1
2 . If y ≥ n+12 , then gd(Bi) = +1 and
n− y ≤ n−12 < n+12 , which gives gd(Bic) = −1. If y < n+12 , then gd(Bi) = −1
and gd(Bic) = +1. If n is even, then there is a problem when y = n − y.
Then, [n2 ] =
n
2 , y =
n
2 <
n
2 + 1, and hence gd(Bi) = −1. But then, also
n − y = n2 < n2 + 1 and gd(Bic) = −1, which means that axiom (A-1) is NOT
satisfied. However, axiom (A-2) is satisfied.
For a given i = (i1, ..., in) having x 1’s and n−x 0’s, we consider i′ = (i′1, ..., i′n)
such that {k ∈ N | ik = 1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | i′k = 1}. Hence, in particular, i′ has
x + " 1’s and n − x − " 0’s, where 0 ≤ " ≤ n − x. Let Bi = (b1, ..., bn) and
Bi′ = (b′1, ..., b′n). Then, |{k ∈ N | b′k = 1}| ≥ |{k ∈ N | bk = 1}|. Hence,
if |{k ∈ N | bk = 1}| ≥ [n2 ] + 1, then gd(Bi) = +1 and gd(Bi′) = +1. If|{k ∈ N | bk = 1}| < [n2 ] + 1, then gd(Bi) = −1 and hence gd(Bi′) ≥ gd(Bi). !
For a social network with an arbitrary odd number of players, we can also
apply a procedure slightly different from the Standard Procedure, which we will
call Procedure 2. Under this procedure, an influenced player, when following a
majority of his ‘bosses’, takes also his own inclination into account.
Definition 4.2 Let INF (k) denote the set of players influencing player k ∈ N ,
k /∈ INF (k), INF2yes(k, i) = {m ∈ INF (k) ∪ {k} | im = 1},
INF2no(k, i) = {m ∈ INF (k) ∪ {k} | im = 0}, where i = (i1, ..., in) denotes
the inclination vector. Bi = (b1, ..., bn) denotes the decision vector for i.
For n odd, Procedure 2 for the operators B and gd is defined as follows. For
each k ∈ N :
1. If |INF (k)| = 0, then for each i = (i1, ..., in), bk = ik.
2. If |INF (k)| > 0, then for each i = (i1, ..., in),
(a) if |INF2yes(k, i)| > |INF2no(k, i)|, then bk = 1,
(b) if |INF2yes(k, i)| < |INF2no(k, i)|, then bk = 0,
(c) if |INF2yes(k, i)| = |INF2no(k, i)|, then bk = ik.
For each i = (i1, ..., in),
gd(Bi) =
{
+1 if |{k ∈ N | bk = 1}| ≥ [n2 ] + 1−1 otherwise , (15)
where [x] means the greatest integer not greater than x.
Proposition 4.2 For n odd, the operators B and gd, as defined in Procedure
2, satisfy both axioms (A-1) and (A-2).
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is very similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1. The
results of applying Procedures 1 and 2 can, of course, be different, as illustrated
in Example 4.1. The power index depends on how we define B and gd. The
only requirement is that the axioms (A-1) and (A-2) have to be satisfied.
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Example 4.1 We apply the Standard Procedure and Procedure 2 to Figure
3(f) (see Appendix). Players 1, 3, 4, and 5 are not influenced, but player 2
is influenced by players 1, 3, and 4. Tables 2 and 3 show the group decision
for Figure 3(f) with the Standard Procedure and Procedure 2, respectively (see
Appendix). The Standard Procedure yields the following results:
HB(1) = HB(3) = HB(4) = 116 · (12− 4) = 12 ,
HB(2) = HB(5) = 116 · (8− 8) = 0,
while when applying Procedure 2, we get HB(k) = 116 · (11− 5) = 38 for all k.
Note that Procedure 2, taking into account player 2’s inclinations in some cases,
appears to be fruitful not only for player 2, but also for player 5, who did not
change his behavior. Players 1, 3, and 4 lost some of their power when applying
Procedure 2.
5 Even Number of Players
For an even number of players, the operator B and the group decision gd de-
scribed in the Standard Procedure satisfy axioms (A-1) and (A-2) if, for each
inclination vector i, the decision vector Bi has a different number of 1’s and 0’s.
So, if for an even number of players there is not a draw in Bi, we can still apply
the Standard Procedure.
Hoede and Bakker (1982) mainly considered an odd number of voters, but
for n even, they suggested to ‘add an isolated dummy actor with prescribed
voting behavior, e.g., ‘yes’ if that is the group decision in case of a draw’.
Example 5.1 We can apply our Standard Procedure to a two-player network,
where player 1 influences player 2. In this particular case, (A-1) and (A-2) are
satisfied. We get HB(1) = 1, and HB(2) = 0.
Unfortunately, we cannot apply the Standard Procedure to a two-player
network, in which there are two independent players, because then axiom (A-1)
would not be satisfied. We then add an isolated player, but we assume that he
says ‘no’ in the case of a draw. We get the following result:
gd(B(1, 1)) = gd(1, 1) = +1, gd(B(1, 0, 0)) = gd(1, 0, 0) = −1,
gd(B(0, 1, 0)) = gd(0, 1, 0) = −1, gd(B(0, 0)) = gd(0, 0) = −1,
and, finally, HB(1) = HB(2) = 0.
6 Decisional Power of a Set of Players
Hoede and Bakker (1982) also defined the decisional power index of a set S
of players. In the definition, all actors in S are assumed to have the same
inclination ‘yes’, and we consider the group decisions for all 2n−|S| inclination
vectors of the others, where |S| means, as usual, the number of players in S.
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Definition 6.1 Given B and gd, the decisional power index (the Hoede-Bakker
index) of a set of players S ⊆ N is given by
HB(S) =
1
2n−|S|
·
∑
{i: ik=1 for all k∈S}
gd(Bi). (16)
Hoede and Bakker (1982) proved that for each set S of players, 0 ≤ HB(S) ≤ 1.
We would like to show some other properties of the decisional power of a set
of players. It is straightforward to show that the power index of the whole set
N of players is maximal:
Fact 6.1 For each N , HB(N) = 1.
Another property says that the larger the set of players, the greater (or
equal) the Hoede-Bakker index.
Proposition 6.1 For each S ⊂ S′, HB(S) ≤ HB(S′).
Proof: Assuming S ⊂ S′, there exists S′′ '= ∅ such that S′ = S ∪ S′′ and
S ∩ S′′ = ∅. Hence, |S′| = |S|+ |S′′|. Let us introduce the following notation:
S+ = {i | ik = 1 for all k ∈ S}. (17)
Hence, of course,
(S ∪ S′′)+ = {i | ik = 1 for all k ∈ S ∪ S′′}.
Note that, for each i = (i1, ..., in) ∈ S+, there exists i∗ ∈ (S ∪ S′′)+ (that is,
i∗k = 1 for k ∈ S ∪ S′′) such that i ≤ i∗ and i∗m = im for all m ∈ N \ (S ∪ S′′).
Hence, by virtue of axiom (A-2), gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi∗). In the formula for HB(S),
we will replace each i ∈ S+ by i∗ ∈ (S ∪ S′′)+ having the same inclinations for
each m ∈ N \ (S ∪ S′′). Since |S+| = 2|S′′| · |(S ∪ S′′)+|, we have
HB(S) =
1
2n−|S|
·
∑
{i: ik=1 for all k∈S}
gd(Bi) ≤
1
2n−|S|
·
∑
{i: ik=1 for all k∈S∪S′′}
2|S
′′| · gd(Bi) =
2|S
′′|
2n−|S|
·
∑
{i: ik=1 for all k∈S′}
gd(Bi) =
2|S
′′|
2n−|S|
·HB(S′) · 2n−|S′| = HB(S′).
!
Remark 6.1 Note that the property described in Proposition 6.1 is a (weak)
version of the BLOC POSTULATE (see Section 2) for the decisional power of a
set of players. A larger set of players S′, where S ⊂ S′, has equal or more power
than the set S and, by analogy, than the set S′ \ S. As shown in Example 6.1
below, we can have HB(S) = HB(S′), even if HB(S′ \S) > 0. For this reason,
we speak about a weak version of the bloc postulate.
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Conclusion 6.1 The Hoede-Bakker index of a set of players satisfies a weak
version of the bloc postulate.
The last question we would like to discuss is the following:
Is there a relation between HB(S) and
∑
k∈S
HB(k)?
In fact, the answer is
Anything may happen!
Example 6.1 In order to show that each possible relation (>, <, and =) be-
tween HB(S) and
∑
k∈S HB(k) may appear, we analyze Figure 3(e). When
applying the Standard Procedure to this figure, we get
HB(1) = 58 , HB(2) = HB(3) =
3
8 , HB(4) = HB(5) =
1
8 .
By virtue of Definition 6.1, we get
HB({1, 5}) = 18 · (7− 1) = 34 = HB(1) +HB(5),
HB({1, 2, 3}) = 14 · (4− 0) = 1 < 118 = HB(1) +HB(2) +HB(3),
HB({2, 3, 4}) = 14 · (4− 0) = 1 > 78 = HB(2) +HB(3) +HB(4).
Note that HB(N) = HB({2, 3, 4}), while HB({1, 5}) > 0 (see Remark 6.1).
In Example 6.1, we can recognize something like the PARADOX OF LARGE
SIZE (see Section 2). The Hoede-Bakker index of a set of players may be less
than the sum of the power indices of the players who constitute the set.
Conclusion 6.2 The decisional power index of a set of players may display the
paradox of large size.
7 Some Properties of the Hoede-Bakker Index
In this section, we will analyze some further properties of the decisional power
index of a player. In order to determine the properties of this index, sometimes
we cannot apply the same postulates and paradoxes which were defined for vot-
ing games. Hence, we will first adapt some postulates and paradoxes mentioned
in Section 2 for the Hoede-Bakker set-up. Next, we will check whether the
adapted paradoxes occur for the Hoede-Bakker index. Moreover, we will check
whether the Hoede-Bakker index satisfies the adapted postulates.
7.1 Invariance and Normalization Postulates
The invariance postulate is satisfied, that is, the Hoede-Bakker index of a player
does not depend on his name. The normalization postulate is NOT satisfied
by the Hoede-Bakker index. For instance, for Figure 3(f), with the Standard
Procedure, we have
∑5
k=1HB(k) =
3
2 .
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Definition 7.1 Given B and gd, a player k ∈ N is called a dictator in a social
network if the group decision is always the same as the inclination of player k,
that is, if for each i ∈ I such that ik = 1, gd(Bi) = +1.
Note that from Axiom (A-1) and Definition 7.1 it follows that for each i ∈ I
such that ik = 0, gd(Bi) = −1.
Hoede and Bakker (1982) defined a dictator as a player with a decisional
power index equal to 1. We introduced an equivalent definition of a dictator,
but it is straightforward to show that:
Fact 7.1 Given B and gd for a social network,
∀k ∈ N [HB(k) = 1 ⇐⇒ k is a dictator]. (18)
Note that a dictator does not have to influence all remaining players. We
can show this by analyzing Figures 2(a) and 2(b). In both cases, when applying
the Standard Procedure, we have HB(1) = 1 and HB(k) = 0 for k ∈ {2, 3, 4},
which means that player 1 is a dictator. He has an influence on all remaining
voters in the network presented in Figure 2(a), but he does not have an influence
on player 4 in Figure 2(b).
Proposition 7.1 Given B and gd for a social network,
there is a dictator ⇒
n∑
k=1
HB(k) = 1. (19)
Proof: Suppose that there exists a dictator, say k ∈ N . Hence, for each i ∈ I,
if ik = 1, then gd(Bi) = +1, and if ik = 0, then gd(Bi) = −1. Let us consider
another arbitrary player m ∈ N . There are 2n−1 inclination vectors i such
that im = 1: among them, there are 2n−2 vectors with ik = 1 and 2n−2 with
ik = 0. Moreover, for each i such that im = 1 and ik = 1, there is i′ such
that i′m = 1, i′k = 0 and i
′
j = ij for each j ∈ N \ {k,m}. Hence, gd(Bi) = +1
and gd(Bi′) = −1, because ik = 1, i′k = 0, and k is a dictator. However,∑
{i: im=1} gd(Bi) = 2
n−2 − 2n−2 = 0, and, therefore, ∑nk=1HB(k) = 1. !
7.2 Dummy Postulate
One can easily show that
Fact 7.2 Given B and gd,
∀k ∈ N [HB(k) = 0 ⇐⇒
|{i ∈ I | ik = 1 ∧ gd(Bi) = +1}| = |{i ∈ I | ik = 1 ∧ gd(Bi) = −1}|] (20)
In Section 2, we considered weighted voting games in which players have
weights. When analyzing the Hoede-Bakker index, we will use different param-
eters, like the number of players influenced by a given voter, or the number of
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players influencing a given actor. For a given social network, and for player
k ∈ N , we introduce the following notation:
α(k) - number of players influenced by player k
α(k) = |{j ∈ N | k ∈ INF (j)}| (21)
γ(k) - number of players influencing player k
γ(k) = |INF (k)| (22)
Λ - number of influenced players in a social network
Λ = |{j ∈ N | ∃k ∈ N \ {j} [k ∈ INF (j)]}| (23)
Γ - number of influencing players in a social network
Γ = |{j ∈ N | ∃k ∈ N \ {j} [j ∈ INF (k)]}|. (24)
One might ask whether there is a relation between the Hoede-Bakker index of
a player k being equal to 0 and the statement α(k) = 0 (there are no voters
influenced by this player) or the statement γ(k) > 0 (there are some actors
influencing the given player). One can show that
Proposition 7.2 NONE of the following implications is true:
∀k ∈ N [HB(k) = 0 ⇒ α(k) = 0]
∀k ∈ N [α(k) = 0 ⇒ HB(k) = 0]
∀k ∈ N [HB(k) = 0 ⇒ γ(k) > 0]
∀k ∈ N [γ(k) > 0 ⇒ HB(k) = 0].
Proof: In order to show that the first and the third implications are not true, let
us consider Figure 3(g). Player 1 happens to be a dictator under the Standard
Procedure: HB(1) = 1, HB(k) = 0 for k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}. Hence, HB(2) = 0,
α(2) = 1 > 0, and γ(2) = 0.
In order to prove that the second and the fourth implications are not true, we
consider Figure 3(e). We have α(4) = 0, γ(4) = 2 > 0, and HB(4) = 18 > 0. !
7.3 Monotonicity
It also appears that the number of players influencing a given voter is NOT
proportional to the lack of power of the influenced player. One can prove that
Proposition 7.3 Given a social network, B and gd, the Hoede-Bakker index
does NOT have to be monotonic with respect to γ. It is NOT true that
∀k, k′ ∈ N [(γ(k) > γ(k′) ∧ α(k) = α(k′)) ⇒ HB(k) ≤ HB(k′)].
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Proof: In order to show that HB(k) is not monotonic with respect to γ(k), we
consider Figure 3(d). Under the Standard Procedure, we get
HB(1) = HB(2) = HB(4) = 12 , HB(3) = HB(5) = 0. Hence,
γ(4) = 2 > 1 = γ(3), α(3) = α(4) = 0, and HB(4) = 12 > 0 = HB(3),
and we showed that the implication mentioned is NOT true. !
It also appears that the number of players influenced by a given voter does
NOT have to illustrate the power of the influencing player if we apply, for
instance, Procedure 2.
Proposition 7.4 Given a social network, B and gd, the Hoede-Bakker index
does NOT have to be monotonic with respect to α.
Proof: Let us apply Procedure 2 described in Definition 4.2 to Figure 3(j).
We get HB(1) = HB(2) = HB(4) = 14 and HB(3) = HB(5) =
1
2 . Hence,
α(1) = 2 > 1 = α(5), γ(1) = γ(5) = 0, but HB(1) = 14 <
1
2 = HB(5). !
If we consider TWO social networks with the same number of players, then
the number of players influenced by a given voter does NOT have to illustrate
the power of the influencing players. It is possible that a player who is influenced
(and not influencing) in one social network has a greater power index in this
network than in another network in which this player is influencing (but not
influenced). When considering Figures 3(b) and 3(d), we prove that
Proposition 7.5 Given two social networks, B and gd, the Hoede-Bakker index
does NOT have to be monotonic with respect to α. It is NOT true that
∀k ∈ N [(α′(k) > α(k) ∧ γ′(k) ≤ γ(k)) ⇒ HB′(k) ≥ HB(k)],
where HB′, α′ and γ′ refer to the second social network.
7.4 Paradox of Redistribution and Donation Postulate
In this subsection, we will check whether the redistribution paradox can ap-
pear for the Hoede-Bakker index, and whether the donation postulate (see
Section 2) is satisfied for this index. In the redistribution paradox, we as-
sume that
∑n
k=1 wk =
∑n
k=1 w
′
k, where w1, ..., wn and w
′
1, ..., w′n denote the
weights of the players in the two simple games considered. When looking for
the redistribution paradox for the Hoede-Bakker index, we will assume that∑n
k=1 α(k) =
∑n
k=1 α
′(k), which is equivalent to
∑n
k=1 γ(k) =
∑n
k=1 γ
′(k).
In fact,
∑n
k=1 α(k) =
∑n
k=1 γ(k) and
∑n
k=1 α
′(k) =
∑n
k=1 γ
′(k) denote the
number of ‘arrows’ in the first and the second social networks, respectively.
Definition 7.2 Let ((α(k))nk=1, (γ(k))
n
k=1,Λ,Γ), ((α
′(k))nk=1, (γ
′(k))nk=1,Λ
′,Γ′)
be the parameters of the two n-player social networks A and B, respectively,
where
n∑
k=1
α(k) =
n∑
k=1
α′(k). (25)
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The Hoede-Bakker index displays the paradox of redistribution if
for some k, α′(k) < α(k), γ′(k) > γ(k), and HB′(k) > HB(k), (26)
where HB and HB′ denote the Hoede-Bakker index in social networks A and
B, respectively.
Example 7.1 Let us compare Figures 3(c) and 3(d). In Figure 3(c), the Stan-
dard Procedure gives HB(k) = 38 for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Note that player
2, influenced by all players, has the same power as the voters influencing him.
Moreover, we have Λ = 1, Γ = 4, and, hence, Λ + Γ = 5, α(4) = 1, γ(4) = 0,
HB(4) = 38 , and
5∑
k=1
α(k) = α(1) + α(3) + α(4) + α(5) = 4 =
5∑
k=1
γ(k) = γ(2).
In Figure 3(d), we have Λ′ = 3, Γ′ = 2, hence additionally Λ′ +Γ′ = 5 = Λ+Γ,
5∑
k=1
α′(k) = α′(1) + α′(2) = 4 =
5∑
k=1
α(k),
and equivalently,
5∑
k=1
γ′(k) = γ′(3) + γ′(4) + γ′(5) = 4 =
5∑
k=1
γ(k),
α′(4) = 0 < 1 = α(4), γ′(4) = 2 > 0 = γ(4), but HB′(4) = 12 >
3
8 = HB(4).
By virtue of Example 7.1, we can conclude that
Conclusion 7.1 The Hoede-Bakker index may display the paradox of redistri-
bution.
Let us redefine now the donation postulate for the Hoede-Bakker index.
Definition 7.3 Let ((α(k))nk=1, (γ(k))
n
k=1,Λ,Γ), ((α
′(k))nk=1, (γ
′(k))nk=1,Λ
′,Γ′)
be the parameters of the two n-player social networks A and B, respectively,
where
n∑
k=1
α(k) =
n∑
k=1
α′(k). (27)
The donation postulate for the Hoede-Bakker index requires that
if α′(j) ≥ α(j) and γ′(j) ≤ γ(j) for each j '= k, and
α′(k) < α(k) and γ′(k) > γ(k), then HB′(k) ≤ HB(k), (28)
where HB and HB′ denote the Hoede-Bakker index in social networks A and
B, respectively.
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Example 7.2 In order to show that the donation postulate described in Defi-
nition 7.3 is not satisfied by the Hoede-Bakker index, we compare Figures 3(i)
and 3(d). In Figure 3(i), under the Standard Procedure we have HB(1) = 1,
HB(k) = 0 for each k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, and α(1) = 2, α(2) = 1, α(3) = 0, α(4) = 1,
α(5) = 0, γ(1) = 0, γ(2) = 1, γ(3) = 1, γ(4) = 1, γ(5) = 1, and HB(4) = 0.
In Figure 3(d), we have α′(1) = 2, α′(2) = 2, α′(3) = 0, α′(4) = 0, α′(5) = 0,
and γ′(1) = 0, γ′(2) = 0, γ′(3) = 1, γ′(4) = 2, γ′(5) = 1, and HB′(4) = 12 .
Hence, we get
5∑
k=1
α(k) =
5∑
k=1
α′(k) = 4,
and, of course,
5∑
k=1
γ(k) =
5∑
k=1
γ′(k) = 4,
∀j '= 4 [α′(j) ≥ α(j) ∧ γ′(j) ≤ γ(j)],
and, moreover, α′(4) < α(4), γ′(4) > γ(4), and HB′(4) > HB(4).
Hence, by virtue of Example 7.2, we can conclude that
Conclusion 7.2 The Hoede-Bakker index does not satisfy the donation postu-
late.
7.5 Paradox of Large Size and Bloc Postulate
As was shown in Section 6 (see Conclusion 6.2), the decisional power index of a
set of players may display the paradox of large size. Now, we will check whether
the Hoede-Bakker index of an individual player displays this paradox as well.
We assume that if some voters create an union, then the new player-union will
influence all voters who were influenced by the players forming the union, and
moreover, the voter-union will be influenced by all voters who influenced at least
one member of the union. Since a player cannot influence himself, if a voter
influenced by another one forms a union with his ‘boss’, this influence will be,
in a sense, lost. We can redefine the paradox of large size for the Hoede-Bakker
index of an individual player in the following way:
Definition 7.4 Let ((α(k))nk=1, (γ(k))
n
k=1,Λ,Γ) be the parameters of n-player
social network A. Let P ⊆ N be the set of players who form a single player-
union U , resulting in a new social network B with N \ P ∪ {U} as the set of
players. We assume that
∀k ∈ P ∀j ∈ N \ P [k ∈ INF (j) ⇒ U ∈ INF (j)], (29)
∀k ∈ P ∀j ∈ N \ P [j ∈ INF (k) ⇒ j ∈ INF (U)]. (30)
The Hoede-Bakker index displays the paradox of large size if
HB′(U) <
∑
k∈P
HB(k), (31)
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where HB and HB′ denote the Hoede-Bakker index in social networks A and
B, respectively.
In this subsection, we will also check whether the bloc postulate, the stronger
property of a power index, is satisfied by the Hoede-Bakker index of a separate
player. According to this postulate, if two players form a single voter, then the
new voter has more power than each of the previous players. As was shown in
Section 6 (see Conclusion 6.1), a weak version of the bloc postulate is satisfied by
the Hoede-Bakker index of a set of players. We introduce the following definition
of the bloc postulate for the Hoede-Bakker index of an individual player:
Definition 7.5 Let ((α(k))nk=1, (γ(k))
n
k=1,Λ,Γ) be the parameters of n-player
social network A. Let P ⊆ N be the set of players who form a single player-
union U , resulting in a new social network B with N \ P ∪ {U} as the set of
players. We assume that
∀k ∈ P ∀j ∈ N \ P [k ∈ INF (j) ⇒ U ∈ INF (j)], (32)
∀k ∈ P ∀j ∈ N \ P [j ∈ INF (k) ⇒ j ∈ INF (U)], (33)
∀k ∈ P [HB(k) > 0]. (34)
The bloc postulate for the Hoede-Bakker index requires that
∀k ∈ P [HB′(U) > HB(k)], (35)
where HB and HB′ mean the Hoede-Bakker index in social networks A and B,
respectively.
Example 7.3 Let us consider Figure 3(e). The Hoede-Bakker indices are as
follows: HB(1) = 58 , HB(2) = HB(3) =
3
8 , and HB(4) = HB(5) =
1
8 .
Let us suppose now that players 1, 2, and 3 decide to unite, resulting in only
three players: player 1+2+3, player 4, and player 5. Since in Figure 3(e), player
4 is influenced by voters 1 and 2, and player 5 is influenced by voters 1 and 3,
the new player 1+2+3 will influence actors 4 and 5. Hence, we get Figure 1(c)
with 1+2+3 instead of 1, 4 instead of 2, and 5 instead of 3. Hence,
HB′(1 + 2 + 3) = 1, HB′(4) = HB′(5) = 0.
We can recognize an occurrence of the paradox of large size, because
HB′(1 + 2 + 3) = 1 < 118 = HB(1) +HB(2) +HB(3).
We start again with Figure 3(e), but now we assume that players 2, 3, and 4
decide to form one player 2+3+4. In this case, player 2 loses his influence on
player 4, but player 4 should gain, because there is only one voter influencing
him (that is, player 1) and moreover, owing to his union with player 3, he will
influence voter 5. The new situation is described by Figure 1(b) with 2+3+4
instead of 2 and 5 instead of 3. Hence, we get
HB′′(1) = 14 · (4− 0) = 1, HB′′(2 + 3 + 4) = HB′′(5) = 14 · (2− 2) = 0,
which means that the bloc postulate is not satisfied and that all players forming
the new voter 2+3+4 lose power, even player 4:
HB′′(2 + 3 + 4) = 0 < 38 = HB(2), HB
′′(2 + 3 + 4) = 0 < 38 = HB(3), and
HB′′(2 + 3 + 4) = 0 < 18 = HB(4).
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By virtue of Example 7.3, we can conclude that
Conclusion 7.3 The Hoede-Bakker index may display the paradox of large size.
Conclusion 7.4 The Hoede-Bakker index does not satisfy the bloc postulate.
Of course, Conclusion 7.3 follows from Conclusion 7.4, because if the bloc
postulate is not satisfied, then the new single voter-union has smaller (or equal)
power than at least one previous voter in the union. Hence, the index of the
voter-union is smaller than the sum of the indices of the players forming the
union.
7.6 Paradox of New Members
In this subsection, we will show that the Hoede-Bakker index may display the
paradox of new members. Let us first redefine the paradox of new members for
the Hoede-Bakker index.
Definition 7.6 Let ((α(k))nk=1, (γ(k))
n
k=1,Λ,Γ), ((α
′(k))n+n
′
k=1 , (γ
′(k))n+n
′
k=1 ,Λ
′,Γ′)
be the parameters of two n-player social networks A and B, respectively, where
B is obtained from A by adding n′ ≥ 1 players in such a way that
∀nk=1 [α′(k) ≤ α(k) ∧ γ′(k) ≥ γ(k)]. (36)
The Hoede-Bakker index displays the paradox of new members if
for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, HB′(k) > HB(k), (37)
where HB and HB′ denote the Hoede-Bakker index in social networks A and
B, respectively.
Example 7.4 We consider two examples (both starting with Figure 1(a)) in
which the paradox of new members occurs. Since the Hoede-Bakker index sat-
isfies the invariance postulate, we may change the name of player 3 in Figure
1(a). Let us call him player 5. Hence, we have α(1) = 1, γ(1) = 0, α(2) = 0,
γ(2) = 1, α(5) = 0, γ(5) = 0, HB(1) = 1 and HB(2) = HB(5) = 0.
Let us suppose that two new players appear: player 3 influencing voter 2 and
player 4 as an independent player. Hence, we get Figure 3(h):
α′(1) = 1, γ′(1) = 0, α′(2) = 0, γ′(2) = 2, α′(5) = 0, γ′(5) = 0,
HB′(1) = HB′(3) = 12 and HB
′(2) = HB′(4) = HB′(5) = 14 .
This means that two old players, voter 2 and voter 5, gained in power after
players 3 and 4 entered, because HB′(k) = 14 > 0 = HB(k) for k ∈ {2, 5}.
If for Figure 1(a) with players 1, 2, and 5, we add two independent players
(voter 3 and voter 4), then we get Figure 3(b). We then have
α′′(1) = 1, γ′′(1) = 0, α′′(2) = 0, γ′′(2) = 1, α′′(5) = 0, γ′′(5) = 0,
HB′′(1) = 34 , HB
′′(2) = 0 and HB′′(k) = 14 for k ∈ {3, 4, 5},
which means that we face again the paradox of new members, because
HB′′(5) = 14 > 0 = HB(5).
Conclusion 7.5 The Hoede-Bakker index may display the paradox of new mem-
bers.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the decisional power index (the Hoede-Bakker index).
Given a social network, different operators B and group decision operators gd
can be constructed that satisfy the two axioms of Hoede and Bakker for B and
gd, but may yield different outcomes. This confirms that the decisional power of
an individual is dependent on the operators B and gd. We proposed a Standard
Procedure for B and gd which satisfies all adopted axioms for a network with an
arbitrary odd number of players. Also, we discussed the case of an even number
of players and we considered the decisional power index of a set of players.
We re-defined some postulates for power indices and a number of voting
power paradoxes, adapting them to a social network and the Hoede-Bakker
set up. Our postulates and paradoxes defined for the Hoede-Bakker index are
dependent on some parameters of a social network, and they are not equivalent
to the postulates and paradoxes defined for voting games. Using examples, we
showed that the Hoede-Bakker index displays our re-defined paradoxes: the
paradox of redistribution, the paradox of large size, and the paradox of new
members. In addition, we showed that the Hoede-Bakker index does not satisfy
some of our re-defined postulates: the monotonicity, the donation, and the bloc
postulate.
The aim of the paper was to analyze the original Hoede-Bakker index defined
by Hoede and Bakker (1982). The paper was concentrated on the properties
of the Hoede-Bakker index, as stated in the title. In particular, we did not
consider any possible ‘improvements’ and any applications of this index. There
are several possible directions for further research on the Hoede-Bakker index.
One may analyze the theoretical value of this index in a more detailed way,
including some possible extensions of the index. Another direction concerns
applications of the Hoede-Bakker index. As mentioned in the Introduction, the
Hoede-Bakker index has already been applied to politics, in particular, to Dutch
parliament. In our future research, we intend to work on further applications
of this index. In particular, we would like to apply the Hoede-Bakker index to
some European parliaments. Stokman and Willer (1999) applied the Hoede-
Bakker index, in particular, to Dutch parties, using party orderings given by
van Roozendaal (1992, 1993). We would like to apply the Hoede-Bakker in-
dex, in particular, to Polish parliament. In the Polish literature on Political
Science there are results concerning party orderings. Based on some question-
naire experiments among Polish parties, Haman (2001) analyzed an ideological
dimension for Polish parties. His results were applied, in particular, by Jasinski
(2002) to construct social networks concerning Polish parties. Based on the
results mentioned above, there are clearly many possibilities for applying the
Hoede-Bakker index.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Examples of social network for n = 3
(a) !1
! 2 !3!!"
(b) ! 1
!2 !3!!" ###$%
(c) !1
! 2 !3!!" ###$
Figure 2: Examples of social network for n = 4
(a) !1
! 2 ! 3 ! 4!!" &###$
(b) !1
! 2 ! 3 ! 4!!" &
Figure 3: Examples of social network for n = 5
(a) !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 (b) !1 !3 !4 !5
! 2&
(c) !1 !3 !4 !5
!2###$& !!"
''''''(
(d) !1 !2
! 3 ! 4 ! 5!!" ###$ !!" ###$
(e) !2 !1 !3
!4 ! 5###$ !!" ###$ !!"
(f) !1 !3 !4 !5
! 2###$& !!"
(g) !1 !2
! 3 ! 4 ! 5!!" &###$ !!"
(h) !1 !3 !4 !5
! 2###$&
(i) !1 !2 !4
! 3 ! 5!!" ###$
%ﬀ (j) !1
! 2 !3 ! 4
!5
!
!
"
#
#
#$ %
!
!
"
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Table 1: Group decision for Figure 1(b) - family network
inclination i Bi gd(Bi) inclination i Bi gd(Bi)
(1,1,1) (1,1,1) +1 (0,0,0) (0,0,0) −1
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) +1 (0,0,1) (0,0,0) −1
(1,0,1) (1,1,1) +1 (0,1,0) (0,0,0) −1
(0,1,1) (0,0,1) −1 (1,0,0) (1,1,0) +1
Table 2: Group decision for Figure 3(f) with Standard Procedure
inclination i Bi gd(Bi) inclination i Bi gd(Bi)
(1,1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) +1 (0,0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) −1
(1,1,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) +1 (0,0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) −1
(1,1,1,0,1) (1,1,1,0,1) +1 (0,0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,1,0) −1
(1,1,0,1,1) (1,1,0,1,1) +1 (0,0,1,0,0) (0,0,1,0,0) −1
(1,0,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) +1 (0,1,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) −1
(0,1,1,1,1) (0,1,1,1,1) +1 (1,0,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0,0) −1
(1,1,1,0,0) (1,1,1,0,0) +1 (0,0,0,1,1) (0,0,0,1,1) −1
(1,1,0,1,0) (1,1,0,1,0) +1 (0,0,1,0,1) (0,0,1,0,1) −1
(1,0,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) +1 (0,1,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) −1
(0,1,1,1,0) (0,1,1,1,0) +1 (1,0,0,0,1) (1,0,0,0,1) −1
(1,1,0,0,1) (1,0,0,0,1) −1 (0,0,1,1,0) (0,1,1,1,0) +1
(1,0,1,0,1) (1,1,1,0,1) +1 (0,1,0,1,0) (0,0,0,1,0) −1
(0,1,1,0,1) (0,0,1,0,1) −1 (1,0,0,1,0) (1,1,0,1,0) +1
(1,0,0,1,1) (1,1,0,1,1) +1 (0,1,1,0,0) (0,0,1,0,0) −1
(0,1,0,1,1) (0,0,0,1,1) −1 (1,0,1,0,0) (1,1,1,0,0) +1
(0,0,1,1,1) (0,1,1,1,1) +1 (1,1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0,0) −1
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Table 3: Group decision for Figure 3(f) with Procedure 2
inclination i Bi gd(Bi) inclination i Bi gd(Bi)
(1,1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) +1 (0,0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) −1
(1,1,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) +1 (0,0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) −1
(1,1,1,0,1) (1,1,1,0,1) +1 (0,0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,1,0) −1
(1,1,0,1,1) (1,1,0,1,1) +1 (0,0,1,0,0) (0,0,1,0,0) −1
(1,0,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) +1 (0,1,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) −1
(0,1,1,1,1) (0,1,1,1,1) +1 (1,0,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0,0) −1
(1,1,1,0,0) (1,1,1,0,0) +1 (0,0,0,1,1) (0,0,0,1,1) −1
(1,1,0,1,0) (1,1,0,1,0) +1 (0,0,1,0,1) (0,0,1,0,1) −1
(1,0,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) +1 (0,1,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) −1
(0,1,1,1,0) (0,1,1,1,0) +1 (1,0,0,0,1) (1,0,0,0,1) −1
(1,1,0,0,1) (1,1,0,0,1) +1 (0,0,1,1,0) (0,0,1,1,0) −1
(1,0,1,0,1) (1,0,1,0,1) +1 (0,1,0,1,0) (0,1,0,1,0) −1
(0,1,1,0,1) (0,1,1,0,1) +1 (1,0,0,1,0) (1,0,0,1,0) −1
(1,0,0,1,1) (1,0,0,1,1) +1 (0,1,1,0,0) (0,1,1,0,0) −1
(0,1,0,1,1) (0,1,0,1,1) +1 (1,0,1,0,0) (1,0,1,0,0) −1
(0,0,1,1,1) (0,0,1,1,1) +1 (1,1,0,0,0) (1,1,0,0,0) −1
Table 4: The Hoede-Bakker index with Standard Procedure
Figure→ 1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 3(b) 3(d) 3(e) 3(f) 3(g) 3(h)
HB(k) ↓ (b)(c) 2(b) 3(c) 3(i)
HB(1) 1 1 38
3
4
1
2
5
8
1
2 1
1
2
HB(2) 0 0 38 0
1
2
3
8 0 0
1
4
HB(3) 0 0 38
1
4 0
3
8
1
2 0
1
2
HB(4) − 0 38 14 12 18 12 0 14
HB(5) − − 38 14 0 18 0 0 14
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